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We investigate the relationship between inequality and intergenerational
mobility. Proxying fathers’ earnings with using detailed occupational data,
we find that sons who grew up in countries that were more unequal in the
1970s were less likely to have experienced social mobility by the late-1990s.
I. Introduction
A common view among citizens of large industria-
lized countries is that economic inequality is fair,
provided there are equal opportunities.1 At the same
time, there tends to be a belief that equal opportunity
norms are violated when the degree of intergenera-
tional mobility is low and family background exerts
a strong influence on children’s income in adulthood.
It is therefore reasonable to think that inequality may
be more acceptable in a society with a high level of
social mobility.
Despite this important conceptual nexus between
social mobility and inequality, the literatures on
inequality and intergenerational mobility have largely
developed in isolation from one another. That very
little is known about the association between inequal-
ity and intergenerational mobility stands in contrast
to the burgeoning literature on the consequences
of inequality for variables such as economic growth,
health and political behaviour. To the extent that
other studies have looked at the relationship between
inequality and social mobility, the analysis has
been descriptive, or focused around the question
of ‘American exceptionalism’. To our knowledge,
there is no previous study that has formally tested the
hypothesis that there is a relationship between
a country’s level of inequality and the degree of
intergenerational mobility.
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship
between inequality and intergenerational mobility
is unclear. One possibility is that when inequality
between parents increases, intergenerational mobility
will fall because it is easier for rich parents to buy
their children educational advantages that less well-
off parents cannot afford (Burtless and Jencks, 2003).
But as Solon (2004) argues, this effect will be
undermined to the extent that children from less
advantaged backgrounds disproportionately benefit
from public programs.
Another channel through which inequality might
affect intergenerational mobility is via the demand for
redistribution. In more unequal societies, the median
voter will tend to lie further below the mean income
and may have a stronger preference for redistribution
(Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Conversely, if higher
inequality increases the political influence of
the wealthy – perhaps through campaign finance
contributions – then the scope for government to
institute progressive policies may narrow (Burtless
and Jencks, 2003). Finally, higher inequality might
reduce intergenerational mobility to the extent that
it leads to segregation along income lines, resulting in
adverse peer effects for children from low-income
families (Durlauf, 1996).
II. Estimating Intergenerational Mobility
A major obstacle to systematic empirical research
into the link between inequality and intergenerational
*Corresponding author. E-mail: andrew.leigh@anu.edu.au
1 In 1991, almost all adults in West Germany, Britain and the United States, and a majority of adults in Japan, agreed with the
statement ‘It’s fair if people have more money and wealth, but only if there are equal opportunities.’ (Jencks and Tach, 2006).
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mobility is the lack of suitable data. The ideal dataset
to address this question would have two main
features. First, it would be comparable such that
cross-country differences in estimated mobility are
meaningful and do not derive from differences in data
construction across countries. Second, it would
contain panel data on the incomes of fathers and
sons at economically active ages. The 1999 Social
Inequality III module of the International Social
Survey Program (ISSP) – which we utilize in this
article – scores highly on the first criteria to the
extent that it contains information, collected on
a consistent basis, for individuals from a large
number of countries. However, this is partly offset
by the fact that the ISSP does not explicitly contain
data on parental earnings. We therefore follow
a spate of previous studies (e.g. Bjo¨rklund and
Ja¨ntti, 1997; Grawe, 2001; Leigh, 2007) in using
predicted parental earnings as a proxy for actual
parental earnings.
Our empirical strategy involves a three-step estima-
tion procedure, using data on men aged 25–54 in
the 1999 ISSP. First, for each of the 16 countries
where data on fathers’ occupation is available, we
regress the relationship between log hourly wages yij
of individual i in occupation j on a vector of dummies
for each occupation Xij, and a quadratic in age Ai,
yij ¼ !0jXij þ Ai þ A2i þ "ij ð1Þ
Second, the earnings of fathers in occupation j are
then predicted to be the same as those of a 40 year
old in occupation j. Algebraically, where A¼ 40,
y^f¼j ¼ y^j.
Third, we estimate the relationship between sons’
actual log hourly wages and fathers’ predicted log
hourly wages,
ysi ¼ "þ #y^f¼j þ Ai þ A2i þ "i ð2Þ
These three steps are performed separately for each
country in the sample.
The coefficient # in Equation 2 denotes the
intergenerational elasticity (IGE), being the percen-
tage change in the son’s earnings for doubling
of the father’s earnings. Another common measure
of intergenerational mobility is $, the intergenera-
tional correlation (IGC) which is based on estimating
the same regression, but with the variance in
earnings held constant between the two periods.
The relationship between the two measures is a
function of the ratio of the standard deviation of
earnings in the two generations,
$ ¼ # %f
%s
ð3Þ
In this article, we focus primarily on the IGC
because the above approach, which imputes fathers’
earnings with fathers’ occupations, compresses the
variance of fathers’ earnings, which in turn inflates
our estimates of the IGE. However, we also test
the robustness of our results to using the IGE.
Estimates of the IGE and IGC for each country are
listed in Andrews and Leigh (2008).
Among employed fathers and sons, three factors
drive intergenerational mobility: (i) sons working in
different occupations from their fathers (inter-occu-
pational mobility); (ii) sons working in the same
occupation but with lower or higher earnings than
their fathers (intra-occupational mobility) and
(iii) changes in the average earnings of occupations
over time. The method employed here will capture
inter-occupational mobility (factor i), but will only
capture part of intra-occupational mobility (factor ii),
since fathers in the same occupation are assigned the
same wage. Moreover, this approach will not take
account of changes in the average earnings of
occupations over time (factor iii). To gauge the
likely importance of this issue, we use microdata from
US Censuses to calculate the mean age-adjusted log
earnings of men aged 25–54 in 192 occupations. The
correlation between an occupation’s mean earnings in
1970 and 2000 was 0.71. While this correlation is
reassuringly high, there is still a possibility that our
approach will mis-estimate the true level of inter-
generational mobility.
To help validate our estimates, we calculated the
correlation between our estimated levels of inter-
generational mobility and those published elsewhere.
With three common countries, the correlation
between our IGCs and those of Ja¨ntti et al. (2006)
is 0.70. With four common countries, the correlation
between our IGEs and those of Solon (2002) is 0.77.
III. Inequality and Social Mobility
To measure income inequality, we use the Gini
coefficient, a measure of the income gap between
two randomly selected individuals in the population.
Where possible, we utilize the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) – probably the most reliable source
for cross-country estimates of income inequality
(Atkinson, 2004). For the four countries in our
sample that do not participate in the LIS, we use
the highest quality estimate from the Deininger
and Squire (1996) database. We use the closest
estimate to the year 1975 – the likely period when
the parents in the sample were making decisions
about investments in their children’s human capital
1490 D. Andrews and A. Leigh
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(the sons in our sample were aged 25–54 in 1999,
so they were aged 1–30 in 1975). For Australia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Spain, LIS estimates of income inequality are only
available for the 1980s and 1990s, though estimates
for the early 1970s are available in the Deininger–
Squire database. For these countries, a tradeoff
exists between using the most appropriate time
period and the highest-quality inequality estimates.
As such, we also conduct our analysis using data
sourced solely from each dataset.
The relationship between inequality and inter-
generational mobility for all 16 countries in our
sample is depicted in Fig. 1. While a positive
relationship between inequality and intergenera-
tional mobility is discernible, this is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. However, for the
six former Warsaw Pact countries in our sample,
which were not market economies in the 1970s,
it may be unreasonable to draw a link between
inequality in the 1970s and intergenerational
mobility between the 1970s and late 1990s.
(Recall that the theoretical explanations suggesting
a relationship between inequality and social
mobility include private expenditure on education,
political donations and median voter models. These
are more likely to apply in capitalist democracies
than in Communist countries.)
As such, Fig. 2 excludes the six former Warsaw
Pact countries. The coefficient on inequality
becomes statistically significant at the 1% level
and the magnitude of the coefficient almost
doubles. In addition, the R2 rises to 0.71. To
account for the possibility that these statistical
results are gaining leverage from the inclusion of
Chile, we excluded this country from the sample
and re-estimated the model. Even when we dropped
Chile, however, the Gini coefficient was significant
at the 6% level.
We performed a series of robustness checks to
confirm these results. First, we re-estimated our
results using Gini coefficients sourced exclusively
from the Deininger–Squire database, which contains
inequality measures of lower quality but of the
appropriate vintage (the database has pre-1980
inequality measures for all but two countries,
Russia and Latvia). Second, we used only Gini
coefficients from the LIS database, whose estimates
are generally regarded as higher quality, but are not
necessarily derived from surveys in the 1970s. Third,
we re-specified the dependent variable to the IGE
instead of the IGC. Fourth, we added controls for the
rate of return to education in the 1970s, and the log of
GDP per-capita in 1975 (sources for these variables
are described in Andrews and Leigh, 2008). In each of
these robustness checks, and in combinations of
them, the results are very close to those above, both
in magnitude and statistical significance. The only
exception is that when we use solely LIS inequality
estimates, the coefficient on the IGC/IGE is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. By
contrast, when we use Gini coefficients sourced
exclusively from the Deininger–Squire database, the
relationship between inequality and the IGC/IGE is
statistically significant at the 5% level, even including
the former Warsaw Pact countries.
IV. Conclusion
Using cross-country data, we find that sons who grew
up in more unequal countries in the 1970s were less
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Fig. 1. Full sample.
q¼%0.01þ 0.70 *Gini (t¼ 1.57) R2¼ 0.22
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Fig. 2. Excluding former communist countries.
q =%0.19þ 1.32 *Gini (t¼ 12.01) R2¼ 0.71 (excl. Warsaw
Pact).
q =%0.19þ 1.30 *Gini (t = 2.87) R2= 0.52 (excl. Warsaw
Pact and Chile)
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likely to have experienced social mobility by 1999.
Across countries, our estimates suggest that a
10-point rise in the Gini coefficient is associated
with a 0.07–0.13 increase in the intergenerational
earnings correlation. Moving from rags to riches
is harder in more unequal countries.
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